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A supermarket game is considered with N FCFS queues with unit
exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate Nλ. Upon
arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled
uniformly at random and joins the least loaded sampled queue. Cus-
tomers are assumed to have cost for both waiting and sampling, and
they want to minimize their own expected total cost.
We study the supermarket game in a mean field model that cor-
responds to the limit as N converges to infinity in the sense that (i)
for a fixed symmetric customer strategy, the joint equilibrium dis-
tribution of any fixed number of queues converges as N → ∞ to a
product distribution determined by the mean field model and (ii) a
Nash equilibrium for the mean field model is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
for the finite N model with N sufficiently large. It is shown that there
always exists a Nash equilibrium for λ < 1 and the Nash equilibrium
is unique with homogeneous waiting cost for λ2 ≤ 1/2. Furthermore,
we find that the action of sampling more queues by some customers
has a positive externality on the other customers in the mean field
model, but can have a negative externality for finite N .
1. Introduction. Consider a stream of customers arriving to a multi-
server system where any server is capable of serving any customer. Upon
arrival, customers are unaware of the current queue length at servers, so
they sample a few servers and join the server with the shortest queue among
the sampled few. Customers have time cost proportional to the waiting time
at servers and sampling cost proportional to the number of sampled servers.
Customers are self-interested and aim to minimize their own total cost by
choosing the optimal number of servers to sample. Note that the waiting
time of a customer depends on the other customers’ choices, so it is a game
among the customers and we call it the supermarket game, because often in
supermarkets customers try to find counters with short queue to check out.
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1.1. Motivation. The supermarket game is a simple model for analyzing
distributed load balancing in transportation and communication networks.
Load balancing ensures efficient resource utilization and improves the qual-
ity of service, by evenly distributing the workload across multiple servers.
Traditionally, load balancing is fulfilled by a central dispatcher that assigns
the newly arriving work to the server with the least workload. As modern
or future networks become larger and increasingly distributed, such central
dispatcher may not exist, and thus the load balancing has to be carried out
by customers themselves. Hence, the supermarket game is relevant in sce-
narios where (1) customers choose which server to join without directions
from a central dispatcher or tracker; (2) global workload or queue length
information is not available and customers randomly choose a finite number
of servers to probe; (3) there is cost associated with probing a server and
waiting in a queue.
Examples of such scenarios are the following:
• Network routing: customers represent traffic flows and servers represent
possible routes from a given source to a destination. A traffic flow can
find the route with low delay by probing different routes.
• Dynamic wireless spectrum access: customers represent wireless devices
and servers represent all the shared spectrum. The wireless devices can
find the spectrum band with low interference and congestion by probing
multiple spectrum bands.
• Cloud computing service: customers can decide how many servers to
probe in seeking the server with low delay.
In this paper, we address the following natural questions for these systems:
How many servers will a self-interested customer sample? Is sampling or
probing more servers by some customers beneficial or detrimental to the
others?
1.2. Main Results. The supermarket game with finite number of servers
is difficult to analyze due to the correlation among queues at different servers.
Therefore, we study the supermarket game in a mean field model that cor-
responds to the limit as the number of servers converges to infinity. By
assuming: (1) unit exponential service rate at servers; (2) Poisson arrival of
customers; (3) homogeneous waiting cost and sampling cost, it is shown that:
• There exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for all arrival rates per
server less than one.
• The action of sampling more servers by some customers has a pos-
itive externality on the other customers, which further implies that
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customers sample no more queues for any Nash equilibrium than for
the socially optimal strategy.
• Nash equilibrium is unique for arrival rates per server less than or equal
to 1/
√
2.
• Nash equilibrium is unique if and only if a local monotonicity condition
is satisfied. This condition is used to explore the uniqueness numerically
for arrival rates per server larger than 1/
√
2.
• Multiple Nash equilibria exist for a particular example with arrival
rates per server equal to 0.999.
• Nash equilibrium is unique for arrival rates per server equal to 0.999 if
customers can only sample either one queue or two queues.
Then, we consider the heterogenous waiting cost case and prove the existence
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in that case.
We also show that the mean field model arises naturally as the limit of
supermarket game with finite number of servers:
• A propagation of chaos result and a coupling result similar to the ones
in [7] and [20] hold, and thus the joint equilibrium distribution of any
fixed number of queues converges to a product distribution determined
by the mean field model as the number of queues converge to infinity.
• A Nash equilibrium of the supermarket game in the mean field model
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the supermarket game for finite number of
servers with the number of servers large enough.
Furthermore, in the supermarket game with finite number of servers, we find
that sampling more queues by some customers has a nonnegative external-
ity on customers who only sample one queue, but it can have a negative
externality for customers sampling more than one queue, which is in sharp
contrast to the conclusion in the mean field model.
1.3. Related Work. The supermarket game is formulated based on the
classical supermarket model with N parallel queues in which customers sam-
ple a fixed number L of queues uniformly at random and join the shortest
sampled queue. The supermarket model has been extensively studied in the
literature using the mean field approach. Vvedenskaya et. al. [21] shows that
in the mean field model, the equilibrium queue sizes decay doubly exponen-
tially for L ≥ 2. Turner [20] proves an interesting coupling result for fixed
N , which implies that the load in the network is handled better and more
evenly as L increases. Graham [7] proves a chaoticity result on the path space
using the idea of propagation of chaos [17], and Mitzenmacher [16] studies
the model using Kurtz’s theorem. Furthermore, Luczak and McDiarmid [14]
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prove that for L ≥ 2, the maximum queue length scales as ln lnn/ lnL+O(1).
The recent paper by Bramson et. al. [3] analyzes the supermarket model with
general service time distributions. They show that in the case of FCFS dis-
cipline and power-law service time, the equilibrium queue sizes will decay
doubly exponentially, exponentially, or just polynomially, depending on the
power-law exponent and the number of choices L. Ganesh et. al. [6] stud-
ies a variant of the supermarket model, where the customers initially join
an arbitrary server, but may switch to other servers later independently at
random. They find that in the mean field model, the average waiting time
under the load-oblivious switching strategy is not considerably larger than
that under a smarter load-aware switching strategy.
In addition to the supermarket model, the mean field approach has also
been used to analyze scheduling in queueing networks, such as the CSMA
algorithm in a wireless local area network [2] and downlink transmission
scheduling [1]. Also, a recent work [18, 19] investigates the performance trade-
off between centralized and distributed scheduling in a multi-server system
for the mean field model. However, none of above work considers a game-
theoretic framework.
The supermarket game proposed in this paper falls into a large research
area involving equilibrium behavior of customers and servers, known as
queueing games. A comprehensive survey can be found in [9]. A particu-
larly relevant paper by Hassin and Haviv [8] studies a two line queueing
system, where upon arrival each customer decides whether to purchase the
information about which line is shorter, or randomly select one of the lines. It
shows how to find a Nash equilibrium and examines the externality imposed
by an informed customer on the others. A model in which customers can
balk, either before or after sampling the backlog at a single server queue, is
considered in [10]. the paper finds benefits to the service operator of offering
the possibility to balk after the backlog is sampled.
Finally, the supermarket game is also related to and partially motivated by
the theory of mean field games in the context of dynamical games [11, 13].
The mean field game approach studies a weakly coupled, N player game
by letting N →∞. However, we caution that in the supermarket game, we
consider an infinite sequence of customers instead of finitely many customers,
which is different from an N player game.
1.4. Organization of the Paper. Section 2 introduces the precise defini-
tion of the supermarket game to be studied and the key notations. The mean
field model for the supermarket game is studied in Section 3, and justified
in Section 4. Section 5 examines the externality of sampling more queues
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in the finite N model. Section 6 ends the paper with concluding remarks.
Miscellaneous details and proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Model and Notation.
2.1. Model. Consider a supermarket game with N FCFS queues with
exponential service rate one, and global Poisson arrival rate Nλ. Assume
λ < 1 and let L = {1, . . . , Lmax}. Upon arrival, each customer can choose
a number L ∈ L of queues to be sampled uniformly at random, and the
customer joins the sampled queue with the least number of customers, ties
being resolved uniformly at random. Customers are assumed to have cost c
per unit waiting time and cs for sampling one queue. These cost parameters
are the same for all the customers; heterogeneous waiting costs are only
considered in Section 3.6.
For a fixed customer i, if she chooses Li queues to sample, and all the other
customers choose L−i, then by PASTA (Poisson arrival sees time average),
the expected total cost of customer i is given by
C(Li, L−i) = cE[W (Li, L−i)] + csLi,(2.1)
where E[W (Li, L−i)] is the expected waiting time (service time included)
under the stationary distribution. The goal of customer i is to minimize her
own expected total cost by choosing the optimal Li.
Since the supermarket game is symmetric in the customers, we limit our-
selves to symmetric strategies. We call L⋆ ∈ L a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium, if
C(L⋆, L⋆) ≤ C(Li, L⋆), for all Li ∈ L.
Since a pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not always exist, we are also
interested in mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
Let P(L) denote the set of all probability distributions over L. The mixed
strategy µi for customer i is simply a probability distribution in P(L), i.e.,
µi(Li) is the probability that customer i samples Li queues. If all the other
customers use the mixed strategy µ−i, then the expected total cost of cus-
tomer i using µi is given by
C(µi, µ−i) =
Lmax∑
Li=1
C(Li, µ−i)µi(Li),(2.2)
where C(Li, µ−i) is the expected total cost of customer i choosing Li given
all the others choose the mixed strategy µ−i.
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Define the best response correspondence for customer i as BR(µ−i) :=
argminµi C(µi, µ−i). The correspondence BR is a set-valued function from
P(L) to subsets of P(L). We call µ⋆ ∈ P(L) a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium if
C(µ⋆, µ⋆) ≤ C(µi, µ⋆), for all µi ∈ P(L).
In this paper, we are interested in characterizing the Nash equilibria of the
supermarket game.
2.2. Notation. Let X denote a separable and complete metric space,
M(X ) and P(X ) be the space of measures and space of probability mea-
sures on X , respectively. In this paper, X will be L, N, D(R+,N), or the
space of probability measures on these spaces, where N is the set of natural
numbers and D denotes the Skorokhod space. Let L (X) denote the law of
a random variable X on X and δx denote a point probability measure at
x ∈ X . Weak convergence of probability measures is denoted by =⇒.
Define on M(X ) natural duality brackets with L∞(X ) as: for φ ∈
L∞(X ) and µ ∈ M(X ), 〈φ, µ〉 = ∫ φdµ. Without ambiguity, brackets are
also used to denote the quadratic covariation of continuous time martin-
gales: let M1,M2 be two continuous time martingales, then 〈M1,M2〉 is the
standard quadratic covariation process. Define the total variation norm on
M(X ) as ‖µ‖TV = sup{〈f, µ〉 : ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1}. Let ‖µ1 − µ2‖TV be the corre-
sponding total variation distance.
For µ1, µ2 ∈ P(L), use µ1 ≤st µ2 to denote that µ1 is first-order stochasti-
cally dominated by µ2, i.e.,
∑Lmax
j=l µ1(j) ≤
∑Lmax
j=l µ2(j),∀l ∈ L. For x ∈ R,
let ⌊x⌋ denote the maximum integer no larger than x.
3. Supermarket Game in a Mean Field Model. The supermar-
ket game in a mean field model is studied in this section by investigating
the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and the externality of sampling more
queues.
3.1. Mean Field Model. In this subsection, we derive an expression for
the expected total cost incurred by a customer in a mean field model, by
assuming that queue lengths (including customers in service) are independent
and identically distributed.
Suppose all the customers except customer i use the mixed strategy µ−i,
and let rt(k) denote the fraction of queues with at least k customers at time
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t in the mean field model. Then, the mean field equation is given by
drt(k)
dt
=
Lmax∑
l=1
λµ−i(l)
(
rlt(k − 1)− rlt(k)
)
− (rt(k)− rt(k + 1)),(3.1)
which is rigorously derived in Section 4. For now, let us provide some intuition
for each of the drift terms in (3.1):
The term λµ−i(l)(r
l
t(k−1)−rlt(k)) corresponds to the arrivals of customers
sampling l queues. Because queue lengths are i.i.d, rlt(k−1) is the probability
that the minimum queue length of l uniformly sampled queues is greater than
or equal to k−1. Thus, (rlt(k−1)−rlt(k)) is the probability that the minimum
queue length of l uniformly sampled queues is k − 1, which is the same as
the probability that a customer who samples l queues joins a queue with
k − 1 customers. Note that rt(k) is increased if a customer joins a queue
with k − 1 customers. Therefore, ∑Lmaxl=1 λµ−i(l) (rlt(k − 1)− rlt(k)) is the
aggregate drift for rt(k) corresponding to arrivals.
The term (rt(k) − rt(k + 1)) corresponds to departures of customers at
queues with exactly k customers.
Since we are interested in the stationary regime, set drt(k)dt = 0 to yield
equations for the equilibrium distribution denoted by rµ−i(k), k ≥ 0. For
k ≥ 1,
λEµ−i
[
rLµ−i(k − 1)− rLµ−i(k)
]
= rµ−i(k) − rµ−i(k + 1),
where the random variable L is distributed as µ−i. By summing the above
equation for k0 ≤ k < +∞ using telescoping sums and changing k0 to k, it
follows that
rµ−i(0) = 1, rµ−i(k) = λuµ−i(rµ−i(k − 1)),(3.2)
where uµ−i(x) := Eµ−i
[
xL
]
=
∑Lmax
l=1 x
lµ−i(l).
Because queues are independent in the mean field model,
E[W (Li, µ−i)] = 1 + E[N(Li)] = 1 +
∞∑
k=1
P[N(Li) ≥ k] =
∞∑
k=0
rLiµ−i(k),
where N(Li) is the length of the shortest queue among the Li sampled
queues. Therefore,
C(Li, µ−i) = c
∞∑
k=0
rLiµ−i(k) + csLi.(3.3)
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Since g(L) = xL is convex in L ∈ R for x ≥ 0 and strictly convex for
0 < x < 1, it follows that E[W (L, µ−i)] and C(L, µ−i) are strictly convex in
L ∈ R.
Next, we prove several key lemmas which are useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1. The best response set BR(µ−i) consists of probability measures
concentrated on an integer or two consecutive integers.
Proof. Let µi ∈ BR(µ−i). Suppose there exists L1 < L2 < L3 ∈ L such
that µi(L1) > 0 and µi(L3) > 0. Then, by the definition of BR,
C(L1, µ−i) = C(L3, µ−i) ≤ C(L2, µ−i),
which contradicts the fact that C(L, µ−i) is strictly convex in L and thus
the conclusion follows.
Remark 1. Lemma 1 implies that a probability measure µ ∈ BR(µ−i)
can be identified with a unique real number L ∈ [1, Lmax]. A number L ∈
[1, Lmax] with L = ⌊L⌋+p for some 0 ≤ p < 1 is identified with the probability
measure with mass 1− p at ⌊L⌋ and p at ⌊L⌋+1. Thus, we use real numbers
to refer to probability measures in BR(µ−i).
The next lemma translates the stochastic dominance relations between
strategies into the stochastic dominance relations between mean field equi-
librium distributions.
Lemma 2. Fix any µ1, µ2 ∈ P(L) such that µ1 ≤st µ2. Then, for all
k ∈ N, rµ1(k) ≥ rµ2(k). Furthermore, if µ1 <st µ2, then for all k ≥ 2,
rµ1(k) > rµ2(k). Also, it follows that for all k ∈ N and all µ ∈ P(L),
rµ(k) ≤ λk and C(L, µ) is bounded independently of L and µ.
Proof. Since µ1 ≤st µ2, it follows that for all x ∈ [0, 1], uµ1(x) ≥ uµ2(x).
We prove the lemma by induction. If k = 0, then rµ1(0) = rµ2(0) = 1 and
rµ1(0) ≥ rµ2(0) trivially holds. If rµ1(k − 1) ≥ rµ2(k − 1), then
rµ1(k) = λuµ1 [rµ1(k − 1)] ≥ λuµ1 [rµ2(k − 1)]
≥ λuµ2 [rµ2(k − 1)] = rµ2(k).
Therefore, for all k ∈ N, rµ1(k) ≥ rµ2(k). Moreover, if µ1 <st µ2, it follows
that for all x ∈ (0, 1), uµ1(x) > uµ2(x). Thus, for all k ≥ 2, rµ1(k) > rµ2(k).
Let µ1 = δ1 be a point measure at singleton 1. Then, rµ1(k) = λ
k. Because
for any µ ∈ P(L), δ1 ≤st µ, then rµ(k) ≤ λk and C(L, µ) ≤ c/(1 − λ) +
csLmax.
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The next lemma states that C(µi, µ−i) is a continuous function.
Lemma 3. C(µi, µ−i) is jointly continuous with respect to µi and µ−i.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.1.
3.2. Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. In this subsection,
we show the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. It is easy to
see that if there exists µ⋆ with µ⋆ ∈ BR(µ⋆), i.e., µ⋆ is a fixed point of the
best response correspondence, then µ⋆ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Thus, it suffices to show the existence of such a fixed point. The Kakutani
fixed point theorem is used to prove it.
(Kakutani’s Theorem) Let S be a nonempty, compact and convex subset
of some Euclidean space Rn. Let g : S → 2S be a set-valued function on S
with a closed graph and the property that g(x) is a nonempty and convex
set for all x ∈ S. Then g has a fixed point.
In our setting, S = P(L) and g = BR. It is known that P(L), as a
space of probability distribution on finite set, is a nonempty, compact and
convex subset of some Euclidean space. Also, since C(µi, µ−i) is continuous,
by Weierstrass Theorem, BR(µ−i) is a nonempty set. In addition, C(µi, µ−i)
is linear in µi, so BR(µ−i) is a convex set. The last and key step is to prove
that BR has a closed graph, i.e., suppose µ
(n)
−i → µ−i, µ(n)i ∈ BR(µ(n)−i ) and
µ
(n)
i → µi, we need to show that µi ∈ BR(µ−i). It is proved in the following
theorem using the continuity of C(µi, µ−i).
Theorem 1. The supermarket game has a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium in the mean field model.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.2.
The uniqueness of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is proved next in case
λ2 ≤ 1/2. Some definitions and lemmas are introduced first.
For customer i, her marginal value of sampling at an integer Li with all
the others adopting µ−i, is defined as
V (Li, µ−i) := E[W (Li, µ−i)]− E[W (Li + 1, µ−i)].
Intuitively, V (Li, µ−i) characterizes the reduction of expected waiting time
when customer i increases the number of sampled queues from Li to Li +
1. For ease of notation, define V (0, µi) = ∞ and V (Lmax, µi) = 0. Since
E[W (Li, µ−i)] is strictly convex in L ∈ R, V (Li, µ−i) is strictly decreasing in
Li. The following lemma characterizes the best response using V (Li, µ−i).
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Lemma 4. Fix any µ−i ∈ P(L) and any integer Li ∈ L. Then Li ∈
BR(µ−i) if and only if
V (Li, µ−i) ≤ cs/c ≤ V (Li − 1, µ−i).(3.4)
Furthermore, fix any non-integer Li ∈ [1, Lmax]. Then Li ∈ BR(µ−i) if and
only if
V (⌊Li⌋, µ−i) = cs/c.(3.5)
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.3.
The next lemma proves a global monotonicity property of V (Li, µ−i) in
case λ2 ≤ 1/2, which is useful for showing the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
in that case.
Lemma 5. Assume λ2 ≤ 1/2 and fix any µ−i, µ˜−i ∈ P(L) such that
µ−i <st µ˜−i. Then V (Li, µ−i) > V (Li, µ˜−i) for 1 ≤ Li ≤ Lmax − 1. Further-
more, let Li ∈ BR(µ−i) and L˜i ∈ BR(µ˜−i), then L˜i ≤ Li.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.4.
Remark 2. The key ingredient in the proof of Lemma 5 is to show that
rµ−i(2) ≤ Li/(Li + 1) for any Li and µ−i. By Lemma 2, rµ−i(2) ≤ λ2.
Hence, if λ2 ≤ 1/2, then rµ−i(2) ≤ 1/2. Meanwhile, Li/(Li + 1) ≥ 1/2 for
any integer Li. Therefore, if λ
2 ≤ 1/2, then rµ−i(2) ≤ Li/(Li + 1) for any
Li and µ−i. The same argument is used in the next subsection.
Lemma 5 implies that for λ2 ≤ 1/2, a customer tends to sample fewer
queues when all the other customers sample more queues. This is an in-
stance of avoid the crowd behavior [9], leading to uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. If λ2 ≤ 12 , the supermarket game has a unique Nash equi-
librium in the mean field model.
Proof. A Nash equilibrium exists by Theorem 1. Let L⋆, L˜⋆ ∈ [1, Lmax]
denote two possible Nash equilibria; we show that L⋆ = L˜⋆.
Without loss of generality, suppose L⋆ < L˜⋆; by Lemma 5, L⋆ ≥ L˜⋆, which
is a contradiction and concludes the proof.
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Fig 1. The marginal value of sampling V (5, L) with increasing L from 10 to 20 and varying
arrival rate λ.
However, the marginal value of sampling V (Li, L−i) is not always increas-
ing in L−i ∈ [1, Lmax] (L−i refers to a probability distribution here) for
all λ < 1. By numerical results, we find that when λ = 0.99 and Li = 5,
V (Li, L−i) is increasing with L−i for 11 ≤ L−i ≤ 16, as shown in Fig. 1. This
implies that sometimes a customer tends to sample more queues when all
the others sample more queues. This follow the crowd behavior can lead to
multiple Nash equilibria. Such a scenario is described in the next subsection.
3.3. Computation of Nash Equilibrium and Local Monotonicity Condition.
In this subsection, we show how to find a Nash equilibrium and establish the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium if a local monotonicity condition is satisfied.
Then, a specific example where multiple Nash equilibria exist is constructed.
The following lemma determines a Nash equilibrium using the marginal
value of sampling.
Lemma 6. Suppose L⋆ is determined by the following procedure:
(a) If V (Lmax − 1, Lmax) ≥ csc , set L⋆ = Lmax. Otherwise
(b) Let Lˆ := min{L ∈ L : V (L,L+ 1) < csc },
(b1) if V (Lˆ, Lˆ) ≤ csc , set L⋆ = Lˆ.
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(b2) if V (Lˆ, Lˆ) > csc , set L
⋆ = Lˆ+ q⋆, where 0 < q⋆ < 1 is the solution of
V (Lˆ, Lˆ+ q⋆) = csc . Then, L
⋆ is a Nash equilibrium for the supermarket game
in the mean field model.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.5.
Next, we introduce a local monotonicity condition and show the unique-
ness of Nash equilibrium for all values of c and cs if and only if the local
monotonicity condition is satisfied.
Definition 1. Given 0 < λ < 1 and any integer Lmax ≥ 1, the local
monotonicity condition is satisfied for (λ,Lmax) if V (L,L + q) is strictly
decreasing over 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 for each integer L with 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax − 1.
Theorem 3. Given 0 < λ < 1 and any integer Lmax ≥ 1, the super-
market game in the mean field model has a unique Nash equilibrium for all
values of c and cs , if and only if the local monotonicity condition is satisfied
for (λ,Lmax).
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.6.
The following numerical results, depicted in Fig. 2, show that when λ =
0.99, V (L,L+ q) is indeed strictly decreasing with respect to 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 for
L = 1, . . . , 9. For L ≥ 10,
rL+q(2) ≤ rL(2) ≤ r10(2) = 0.99(102−1)/(10−1) ≤ 10/11 ≤ L/(L+ 1),
which implies that V (L,L + q) is strictly decreasing over 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, in
view of the proof for Lemma 5. Therefore, for λ = 0.99 and any integer
Lmax ≥ 1, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for all values of c and cs.
However, when λ = 0.999 and Lmax = 25, V (L,L+ q) is strictly increasing
in q for L = 18, . . . , 24. Therefore, multiple Nash equilibria exist if cs/c =
0.0148, as depicted in Fig. 3. We see that L = 19, . . . , 24 are pure strategy
Nash equilibria and mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist between each two
consecutive pure strategy Nash equilibria.
3.4. Special Case: Two Choices. In this subsection, we consider a simple
special case where all the customers only have two choices, 1 or 2.
Fixing a customer i, if L−i = 1 + q, i.e., all the other customers choose
one queue to sample with probability 1− q and two queues with probability
q, then the stationary distribution in the mean field model can be derived as
rq(0) = 1, rq(k) = λuq(rq(k − 1)), k ≥ 1,
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Fig 2. For λ = 0.99, the marginal value of sampling V (L, L+ q) with increasing q from 0
to 1 and varying L.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
18 
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24 
L 
BR(L) 
Fig 3. The best response with respect to L for λ = 0.999 and cs
c
= 0.0148.
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where uq(x) = x
2q+x(1− q). Note that this stationary distribution has also
been derived in Section 4.4.1 of[15].
Then, the total expected cost of customer i choosing 1 + p is given by
C(1 + p, 1 + q) = (1− p)(c
∞∑
k=0
rq(k) + cs) + p(c
∞∑
k=0
r2q(k) + 2cs).
The marginal value of sampling of customer i at 1 is given by
V (1, 1 + q) =
∞∑
k=0
rq(k)(1 − rq(k)).
It follows that the best response under L−i = 1 + q is given by
BR(1 + q) =


1 if cs/c > V (1, 1 + q),
2 if cs/c < V (1, 1 + q),
[1, 2] if cs/c = V (1, 1 + q).
(3.6)
By numerical results depicted in Fig. 4, we find that V (1, 1+ q) is strictly
decreasing in q for a sequence of λ up to 0.999. This is strong numerical
evidence that the local monotonicity condition is satisfied for all λ < 1.
Therefore, by Theorem 3 and Lemma 4, we conjecture that: (i) if V (1, 1) ≤
cs/c, then L
⋆ = 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium; (ii) if V (1, 2) ≥ cs/c,
then L⋆ = 2 is the unique Nash equilibrium; (iii) otherwise, there exists a
p⋆ ∈ (0, 1) such that V (1, 1 + p⋆) = cs/c, and thus L⋆ = 1+ p⋆ is the unique
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
3.5. Externality and Social Optimum. The action of sampling more queues
by some customers has an effect on the waiting time of others. This effect is
called the externality associated with the action and the externality is posi-
tive if the action reduces the mean waiting time of the other customers. In
this subsection, the externality in the mean field model is analyzed. It is not
clear whether the externality is positive at first sight. On one hand, choosing
a large number of queues to sample helps a customer find a less loaded queue
and hence reduces future arrivals’ opportunity to find lightly loaded queues.
On the other hand, it also leads to a well balanced system and reduces the
average waiting time.
The following corollary of Lemma 2 implies that the action of sampling
more queues by some customers has a positive externality on the other cus-
tomers in the mean field model. To see it, suppose in system 1, all the
customers adopt a strategy µ1; while in system 2, a fraction 0 < p ≤ 1 of
them samples more queues, i.e., adopts a new strategy µ3 with µ1 <st µ3
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Fig 4. The natural logarithm of V (1, 1 + q) with increasing q from 0 to 1, for varying
arrival rate λ.
and all the others still adopt the strategy µ1. For system 2, it is equivalent to
assume that all the customers adopt a strategy µ2 with µ2 = pµ3+(1−p)µ1.
It follows that µ1 <st µ2. By Corollary 1, system 2 has smaller mean waiting
time.
Corollary 1. If µ1, µ2 ∈ P(L) with µ1 <st µ2, then for all L ∈ L,
E[W (L, µ1)] > E[W (L, µ2)].
Proof. Because µ1 <st µ2, by Lemma 2, rµ1(k) > rµ2(k),∀k ≥ 2. Hence,
the conclusion follows by invoking the definition of E[W (L, µ)].
Remark 3. However, the action of sampling more queues by some cus-
tomers can have a negative externality for finite N . See Section 5.
Next, we analyze the social optimum, i.e, the minimum of total cost of
all the customers. Suppose all the customers use the mixed strategy µ; the
expected total cost per unit time Csum(µ) is given by
Csum(µ) = λC(µ, µ) = λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)C(L, µ) = λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)(
∞∑
k=0
rLµ (k) + csL).
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Therefore, a minimizer of the following minimization problem:
min
µ∈P(L)
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)(
∞∑
k=0
rLµ (k) + csL),
is a social optimum.
Lemma 7. The social optimum µ⋆soc is a probability measure concentrated
on either an integer or two consecutive integers.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.7.
Theorem 4. No Nash equilibrium µ⋆ can strictly stochastically dominate
the social optima µ⋆soc in the mean field model.
Proof. The total cost can be decomposed into two terms as
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)C(L, µ) =
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)C(L, µ⋆) +
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L) (C(L, µ)−C(L, µ⋆)) .
Suppose the Nash equilibrium µ⋆ >st µ
⋆
soc, then by the positive externality
result, we have
C(L, µ⋆soc)− C(L, µ⋆) > 0.
Also, by definition of µ⋆,
Lmax∑
L=1
µ⋆soc(L)C(L, µ
⋆) ≥
Lmax∑
L=1
µ⋆(L)C(L, µ⋆).
Therefore,
Lmax∑
L=1
µ⋆soc(L)C(L, µ
⋆
soc) >
Lmax∑
L=1
µ⋆(L)C(L, µ⋆),
which is a contradiction to the definition of µ⋆soc.
Remark 4. Since Nash equilibrium L⋆ and social optimum µ⋆soc can be
identified with real numbers in [1, Lmax], the above lemma further implies
that L⋆ ≤ L⋆soc, i.e., no Nash equilibrium can be above the social optimum.
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3.6. Heterogeneous Waiting Cost. In this subsection, the heterogeneous
waiting cost is considered. In particular, assume that there is a nondegenerate
continuous probability density function for waiting cost c, i.e.,
∫ cmax
0 f(c)dc =
1.
Fix a customer i, let Li(·) denote a function from [0, cmax] to L. We call
Li(·) the strategy of customer i. In particular, if customer i has a waiting cost
c, then she chooses Li(c) queues to sample uniformly at random. Now sup-
pose all the other customers use L−i(·), the expected total cost for customer
i is given by
C(Li, L−i) = cE[W (Li(c), L−i)] + csLi(c).(3.7)
The goal of customer i is to minimize the expected total cost by choosing
the optimal Li(·). Define the best response correspondence as BR(L−i(·)) :=
argminLi(·) C(Li, L−i).
If Li(·) ∈ BR(L−i(·)), then Li(·) must be a nondecreasing step function
with respect to c as depicted in Fig. 5, which is proved in the following
lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose Li(·) ∈ BR(L−i(·)), then Li(·) is a nondecreasing
step function in c.
Proof. Suppose 0 ≤ c < cˆ ≤ cmax, since Li(·) ∈ BR(L−i(·)), we have
cE[W (Li(c), L−i)] + csLi(c) ≤ cE[W (Li(cˆ), L−i)] + csLi(cˆ),
cˆE[W (Li(cˆ), L−i)] + csLi(cˆ) ≤ cˆE[W (Li(c), L−i)] + csLi(c).
Adding the above two inequalities up, we get
(cˆ− c)(E[W (Li(cˆ), L−i)]− E[W (Li(c), L−i)]) ≤ 0.
Therefore E[W (Li(cˆ), L−i)] ≤ E[W (Li(c), L−i)] and thus Li(cˆ) ≥ Li(c).
Define the strategy space S as the collection of all possible nondecreasing
step functions from [0, cmax] to L. By Lemma 8, it suffices to consider S
for finding pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a bijective mapping
between the strategy space S and probability space P(L). In particular,
suppose L(·) ∈ S is given, and let 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax denote
the jumping points. Then, define µ(l) =
∫ cl
cl−1
f(c)dc. On the other hand,
suppose µ ∈ P(L) is given, then the equation µ(l) = ∫ clcl−1 f(c)dc is solved
to get the unique jumping points 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax. Thus,
L(·) can be constructed as L(c) = l for cl−1 ≤ c < cl. Define a metric on the
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Fig 5. The best response strategy Li(·) ∈ BR(L−i(·)) is a non-decreasing step function.
The jumping points are denoted by 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax.
strategy space S as d(L1(·), L2(·)) := ‖µL1 − µL2‖. Also, Let F denote the
bijective mapping from L(·) to µL and F−1 denote the inverse mapping. It
is easy to see that F and F−1 are continuous.
Next, we show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the
mean field model. First, let us derive the expression of E[W (Li, L−i)] in
mean field equilibrium. Suppose all the customers except customer i use the
strategy L−i(·). Due to the bijective mapping between the strategy space
and probability space, it is equivalent to consider the case in which all the
customers use the mixed strategy µL−i . Therefore, the mean field equilibrium
distribution satisfies rL−i(k) = rµL−i (k), and the expected waiting time of
customer i using strategy Li(·) is given by
E[W (Li(c), L−i)] = E[W (Li(c), µL−i)] =
∞∑
k=0
rLi(c)µL−i
(k).
Lemma 9. The best response correspondence BR(L−i) is a continuous
function.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.8.
Define the best response from P(L) to P(L) as B˜R(µ−i) = F (BR(F−1(µ−i))).
Then the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the
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Fig 6. The expected waiting cost of customer i choosing L while the others choosing a
fixed L−i. In this example, Lmax = 5 and c1, . . . , c4 are the jumping points of Li(·) ∈
BR(L−i(·)).
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existence of a fixed point of B˜R. The Brouwer fixed point theorem is used
to prove it.
(Brouwer’s Theorem) Every continuous function g from a convex compact
subset of a Euclidean space to itself has a fixed point.
Theorem 5. The supermarket game with heterogeneous waiting cost has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the mean field model.
Proof. Note that B˜R is a continuous function because F , F−1, and BR
are continuous functions. Also, P(L) is a convex compact subset of an Eu-
clidean space. Therefore, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, B˜R has a fixed
point µ⋆ and thus F−1(µ⋆) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
In the sequel, the stochastic ordering between two possible pure strategy
Nash equilibria is analyzed. For customer i, her marginal value of sampling
at an integer Li(c) with all the others adopting L−i(·) is given by
V (Li(c), L−i(·)) = V (Li(c), µL−i) =
∞∑
k=0
(rLi(c)µL−i
(k)− rLi(c)+1µL−i (k)).
The next lemma generalizes Lemma 5 and proves a global monotonicity
result of V (Li(c), L−i(·)).
Lemma 10. Assume λ2 ≤ 1/2 and fix any L−i(·), L˜−i(·) ∈ S such that
µL−i <st µL˜−i. Then V (Li(c), L−i) > V (Li(c), L˜−i) for all 1 ≤ Li(c) ≤
Lmax − 1. Furthermore, let Li(·) ∈ BR(L−i(·)) and L˜i(·) ∈ BR(L˜−i(·)), then
µL˜i ≤st µLi.
Proof. By Lemma 5, it follows that V (Li(c), L−i) > V (Li(c), L˜−i) for
all 1 ≤ Li(c) ≤ Lmax − 1. Next, we show that µL˜i ≤st µLi . Denote the
jumping points of Li and L˜i by 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax and
0 = c˜0 < c˜1 < · · · < c˜Lmax = cmax respectively. It suffices to show that
cj ≤ c˜j for 0 ≤ j ≤ Lmax. Fig. 6 shows that for 1 ≤ j ≤ Lmax − 1,
cj =
cs
V (j, L−i)
, c˜j =
cs
V (j, L˜−i)
,
which implies that cj ≤ c˜j .
Corollary 2. Let L⋆1(·) and L⋆2(·) denote two possible distinct Nash
equilibria for supermarket game with heterogeneous waiting cost in the mean
field model. If λ2 ≤ 12 , then µL⋆1 and µL⋆2 cannot be stochastically ordered.
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Proof. Suppose µL⋆1 <st µL⋆2 . Then, by Lemma 10, µL⋆1 ≥st µL⋆2 , which
is a contradiction to assumption and concludes the proof.
Remark 5. We are unable to prove the uniqueness of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium because stochastic dominance is not a total order, i.e., there exists
µ1 and µ2 which cannot be stochastically ordered.
4. Justification of Mean Field Model. In this section, we justify the
mean field model as the right limit of the supermarket game with finite N as
N → ∞ by studying the equilibrium queue length distribution and ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
4.1. Propagation of Chaos. In this subsection, we rigorously prove the
propagation of chaos and coupling result for the finite N model with all the
customers using strategy µ ∈ P(L). Our proof techniques are essentially the
same as [7] and [20]. The only difference is that we consider a slightly more
general case where customers’ choices are random instead of deterministic
and fixed.
Denote by QNi (t) the length of queue i at time t. The process of {QNi } is
Markov, and the empirical distribution νN = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 δQNi
has samples
in P(D(R+,N)). Define the marginal process Q¯N = (Q¯Nt )t≥0 as
Q¯Nt = ν
N
t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δQNi (t)
.
The marginal process Q¯N has sample paths in D(R+,P(N)). The fraction of
queues of length at least k at time t can be written as rNt (k) = Q¯
N
t ([k,∞)).
For Γ ∈ P(X ), a sequence of random variables (Xi)1≤i≤N on X N is
Γ-chaotic if for any fixed integer l ≥ 1, as N →∞,
L (X1, . . . ,Xl) =⇒ Γ⊗l.
A sequence of random variables (Xi)1≤i≤N on X
N is exchangeable if for any
permutation π : [1, . . . , N ]→ [1, . . . , N ],
L (X1, . . . ,XN ) = L (Xπ(1), . . . ,Xπ(N)).
The proof roadmap is summarized in Fig. 7. We first prove a chaoticity
result on path space (Thm. 7), i.e., there exists a Γ ∈ P(D(R+,N)) such that
(QNi )1≤i≤N is Γ-chaotic, if the initial condition (Q
N
i (0))1≤i≤N is chaotic.
Then, we show a chaoticity result in equilibrium (Thm. 10) by (i) taking
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Fig 7. The roadmap to show a chaoticity result in equilibrium.
the large N limit and proving that the solution of the mean field equation
converges as t → ∞ to a fixed point (Lemma 13); (ii) taking the large t
limit and proving the finite N model is ergodic (Thm. 9); (iii) using the
chaoticity result on path space (Thm. 7) to finish the proof. The coupling
result proved in Theorem 8 is used to show the ergodicity result in Theorem
9. The chaoticity result on path space (Thm. 7) is proved using Proposition
2.2 in [17] and the nonlinear martingale problem approach. First, some useful
definitions and preliminary lemmas are stated.
Let (n)k := n(n − 1) · · · (n − k + 1) for integer n ≥ k ≥ 0. Define the
k-body empirical measure as
νk,N =
1
(N)k
N∑
i1,...,ik=1,
distinct
δQNi1 ,...,Q
N
ik
and the k-body empirical measure for queues other than i
νk,Ni =
1
(N − 1)k
N∑
i1,...,ik=1,
distinct, 6=i
δQN
i1
,...,QN
ik
with their marginal process Q¯k,N and Q¯k,Ni . The Lemma 3.1 in [7], restated
in the following lemma, proves that the k-body empirical measure is close to
k-product of the empirical measure νN .
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Lemma 11. ‖νk,N − (νN )⊗k‖TV = O(1/N) and ‖νk,Ni − (νN )⊗k‖TV =
O(1/N).
For a bounded function φ on N, set φ+(x) = φ(x+1)−φ(x) and φ−(x) =
φ(x− 1)− φ(x). Let χL be a function as
χL : (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ NL 7→
1x1=min{x1,...,xL}∑L
i=1 1xi=min{x1,...,xL}
∈ {0, 1/L, . . . , 1/2, 1}.
The next lemma gives a martingale process induced from the Markov process
{QNi }.
Lemma 12. Mφ,i,N is a martingale process defined by
Mφ,i,Nt =φ(Q
N
i (t)) − φ(QNi (0)) −
∫ t
0
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L){λL〈χL(QNi (s), ·), Q¯L−1,Ni (s)〉
φ+(QNi (s)) + 1QNi (s)≥1
φ−(QNi (s))}ds
=φ(QNi (t)) − φ(QNi (0)) −
∫ t
0
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L){λL〈χL(QNi (s), ·), (Q¯Ns )⊗L−1〉
φ+(QNi (s)) + 1QNi (s)≥1
φ−(QNi (s))}ds + ǫφ,i,N (t)
and ǫφ,i,N(t) = t‖φ‖∞O( 1N ) uniformly, 〈Mφ,i,N ,Mφ,j,N 〉 are zero for i 6= j
and E[〈Mφ,i,N ,Mφ,i,N 〉t] ≤ C‖φ‖2∞t2 for a constant C.
Proof. The martingale statement is obtained from the Dynkin formula in
stochastic analysis. The bound on ǫφ,i,N(t) follows from Lemma 11. Also, be-
cause there are no simultaneous jumps, the quadratic covariations 〈Mφ,i,N ,Mφ,j,N〉
are 0 for i 6= j. Lastly, by the definition of quadratic variation and Mφ,i,Nt ,
E[〈Mφ,i,N ,Mφ,i,N 〉t] = E[(Mφ,i,Nt )2]
≤ 3
(
2‖φ‖2∞ + ((λLmax + 1)‖φ‖∞t)2
)
≤ C‖φ‖2∞t2.
Next, we introduce the nonlinear martingale problem which is useful to
prove the propagation of chaos result. We say a law Γ ∈ P(D(R+,N)) solves
the nonlinear martingale problem if for any bounded function φ on N,
Mφt = φ(Qt)− φ(Q0)−
∫ t
0
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L){λL〈χL(Qs, ·),Γ⊗L−1s 〉φ+(Qs)
+ 1Qs≥1φ
−(Qs)}ds(4.1)
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defines a Γ-martingale, where Q ∈ D(R+,N) is distributed as Γ and Γt
is the distribution of Qt. It solves the martingale problem starting at γ if
furthermore Γ0 = γ.
By taking the expectation over two sides of (4.1) and using the result
L〈χL(x)φ+(x1),Γ⊗Ls (dx)〉 = 〈φ+(min{x}),Γ⊗Ls (dx)〉,
we get the nonlinear Kolmogorov equation. We say a (deterministic) process
(Γt)t≥0 ∈ D(R+,P(N)) solves the nonlinear Kolmogorov equation if for any
bounded function φ on N,
〈φ,Γt〉 = 〈φ,Γ0〉+
∫ t
0
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L){λ〈φ+(min{x}),Γ⊗Ls (dx)〉
+ 〈1·≥1φ−,Γs〉}ds(4.2)
and it solves the equation starting at γ if moreover Γ0 = γ. Taking φ equal
to 1[k,∞), and using the fact that
〈φ+(min{x}),Γ⊗Ls (dx)〉 =
∑
x∈N
φ+(x)
(
ΓLs ([x,∞)) − ΓLs ([x+ 1,∞))
)
,
we obtain the mean field equation for rt(k) = Γt([k,∞)) as
drt(k)
dt
= λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)
(
rLt (k − 1)− rLt (k)
) − (rt(k)− rt(k + 1)).(4.3)
The following theorem, which is essentially the same as Theorem 3.3 in [7],
proves that the nonlinear martingale problem has a unique solution.
Theorem 6. Let γ ∈ P(N). Then there is a unique solution Γ ∈ P(D(R+,N))
for the nonlinear martingale problem (4.1) starting at γ. Its marginal process
(Γt)t≥0 is the unique solution for the nonlinear Kolmogorov equation (4.2)
starting at γ, and r = (rt)t≥0 defined by rt(k) = Γt([k,∞)) is the unique
solution for the mean field equation (4.3) starting at r0.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.9.
The following theorem proves a propagation of chaos result on the path
space.
Theorem 7. Assume that (Q¯N0 )N≥1 converges in law to a γ in P(N), or
that (rN0 )N≥1 converges in law to r0 with r0(k) = γ([k,∞)). Then (νN )N≥1
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converges in probability to the unique solution Γ for the nonlinear mar-
tingale problem (4.1) starting at γ, and if (QNi (0))1≤i≤N is exchangeable
then (QNi )1≤i≤N is Γ-chaotic. Moreover, (Q¯
N )N≥1 converges in probability
to (Γt)t≥0 and (r
N )N≥1 converges in probability to (rt)t≥0, for uniform con-
vergence on bounded intervals over t, where rt(k) = Γt([k,∞)). Note that
(Γt)t≥0 is the unique solution for the Kolmogorov equation (4.2) starting at
γ, and (rt)t≥0 is the unique solution for the mean field equation (4.3) starting
at r0.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.10.
The following lemma proves that in the mean field model, starting with
any appropriate initial distribution, the solution of mean field equation (4.3)
will converge to its fixed point.
Lemma 13. In the mean field model, starting with any initial distribution
r0(k) such that
∑
k≥0 r0(k) < ∞, the solution of mean field equation (4.3)
rt(k) converges in t to a fixed point r(k) given by
r(0) = 1, r(k) = λuµ(r(k − 1)).(4.4)
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.11.
Let r
(N,j)
t (k) and Q
(N,j)
i (t) denote the fraction of queues with at least k
customers and the number of customers at queue i respectively for system j
at time t. We can prove the following coupling result in the similar way as
Turner did for the fixed number of sampling queues [20].
Theorem 8. Suppose all the customers adopt µ1 in system 1 and µ2 in
system 2 with µ1 ≤st µ2. Then there is a coupling between the two systems
such that for all t and x,∑
i
[Q
(N,2)
i (t)− x]+ ≤
∑
i
[Q
(N,1)
i (t)− x]+,
where [a]+ = max{a, 0}. It follows that for any nondecreasing convex func-
tion h and for all t,∑
i
h(Q
(N,2)
i (t)) ≤
∑
i
h(Q
(N,1)
i (t)).
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Proof. A coupling between µ1 and µ2 can be constructed as follows.
let F1 and F2 be the cumulative distribution function for µ1 and µ2 re-
spectively. Let U denote the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Then it follows
that F−11 (U) and F
−1
2 (U) is distributed as µ1 and µ2 respectively. Also,
F−11 (U) ≤ F−12 (U).
Let us couple the two systems as follows. All arrival times and departure
times are the same in both systems, except that departures that occur from
an empty queue are lost. At the times of departure, we arrange the queues
in each system in order of queue lengths, and let a departure occur from
the corresponding queue in each system; for example, if it occurs from the
longest queue in system 1, then let it also occur from the longest queue in
system 2. At arrival times, the customer in system 1 samples F−11 (U) queues;
while the customer in system 2 first chooses the same set of queues chosen
by system 1 and then samples additional (F−12 (U)− F−11 (U)) queues.
Using Theorem 4 in [20] and the fact that F−11 (U) ≤ F−12 (U), the conclu-
sion follows.
The coupling result is used to show the ergodicity for QNi , which is proved
in the following theorem.
Theorem 9. For N ≥ 1, (QNi )1≤i≤N is ergodic for λ < 1, and thus has
a unique stationary distribution. Furthermore, in equilibrium (QNi )1≤i≤N is
exchangeable.
Proof. The proof is the same as that in Theorem 4.2 in [7].
The following theorem proves the chaoticity in equilibrium.
Theorem 10. Let rµ be defined as (4.4) and define γµ ∈ P(N) as
γµ(k) = rµ(k) − rµ(k + 1). In equilibrium, (QNi )1≤i≤N is Γ-chaotic, where
Γ is the unique solution for the nonlinear martingale problem (4.1) starting
at γµ, and Q (the Markov process with measure Γ) is in equilibrium under
Γ. Hence in equilibrium (Q¯N )N≥1 converges in probability to the constant
process identically equaling to γµ for all t and (r
N )N≥1 converges in proba-
bility to the constant process identically equaling to rµ for all t, for uniform
convergence on bounded intervals.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.12.
Remark 6. Let QNi (0) be the length of queue i in equilibrium. Theorem
10 implies that (QNi (0))1≤i≤N is γµ-chaotic. By the definition of chaoticity,
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it follows that the joint equilibrium distribution of any fixed number of queues
converges to a product distribution, i.e., for any fixed integer l ≥ 1, as N →
∞,
L (Q
(N)
1 (0), . . . , Q
(N)
l (0)) =⇒ γ⊗lµ .
4.2. ǫ-Nash Equilibrium for Finite N . In this subsection, the ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for finite N queues is considered. For a fixed customer i, sup-
pose she uses the mixed strategy µi, and all the other customers use µ−i. Let
W (N)(µi, µ−i) and C
(N)(µi, µ−i) denote her waiting time and total average
cost for N queues. Then, the expected waiting time can be derived as
E[W (N)(Li, µ−i)] = E
[
min{Q(N)(1), . . . , Q(N)(Li)}
]
+ 1,
where Q(N)(i) is the length of the ith sampled queue.
Next, the definition of ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the finite N model is intro-
duced.
Definition 2. We call µ⋆ ∈ P(L) an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the finite N
model, if for any ǫ > 0, with N sufficiently large,
C(N)(µ⋆, µ⋆) ≤ C(N)(µ, µ⋆) + ǫ, for all µ ∈ P(L).
Theorem 11. Let µ⋆ be a Nash equilibrium for the supermarket game in
the mean field model, then µ⋆ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the finite N model.
Proof. Let Z denote the random variable associated with the mean field
equilibrium distribution rµ−i(k). By Theorem 10, we have that for any fixed
Li, as N →∞,
L (Q(N)(1), . . . , Q(N)(Li)) =⇒ L (Z)⊗Li .
By the coupling result in Theorem 8,
Eµ−i
[
min{Q(N)(1), . . . , Q(N)(Li)}
]
≤ Eµ−i(Q(N)(1)) ≤ Eδ1(Q(N)(1)) =
λ
1− λ,
and henceW (N)(Li, µ−i) is uniformly integrable. Therefore, for ∀ǫ > 0, there
exists N0 ∈ N such that when N ≥ N0,
|E[W (N)(Li, µ−i)]− E[W (Li, µ−i)]| ≤ ǫ
2c
,
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and thus
|C(N)(µ, µ−i)− C(µ, µ−i)| ≤ ǫ/2,
where W (Li, µ−i) and C(µ, µ−i) are the waiting time and total average cost
respectively in the mean field model. By definition of µ⋆,
C(µ⋆, µ⋆) ≤ C(µ, µ⋆), for all µ ∈ P(L).
Then, it follows that
C(N)(µ⋆, µ⋆) ≤ C(N)(µ, µ⋆) + ǫ, for all µ ∈ P(L).
Therefore, µ⋆ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in the finite N system.
5. Externality for finite N . In this section, we study the externality
of sampling more queues by some customers in the finite N model.
The following corollary shows that the action of sampling more queues by
some customers has a nonnegative externality on the other customers who
only sample one queue.
Corollary 3. If µ1, µ2 ∈ P(L) with µ1 <st µ2, then E[W (1, µ1)] ≥
E[W (1, µ2)].
Proof. Suppose all the customers adopt µ1 in system 1 and µ2 in system
2 with µ1 ≤st µ2. Since E[W (1, µi)] = E[ 1N
∑
j Q
(N)
i (j)] for i = 1, 2, it follows
from Theorem 8 that E[W (1, µ1)] ≥ E[W (1, µ2)].
For customers who sample more than one queue, the sampling of more
queues by other customers has a negative externality in the following exam-
ple.
Example: Consider the supermarket game with two servers. All the cus-
tomers adopt µ1 = δ1 in system 1 and µ2 = δ2 in system 2.
For system 1, queue 1 and queue 2 are two independent M/M/1 queues.
Hence, the tail of the equilibrium queue length distribution is given by
rµ1(k) = λ
k and thus E[W (2, µ1)] =
∑∞
k=0 r
2
µ1(k) = 1/(1 − λ2).
For system 2. In the heavy traffic limit λ → 1, Kingman showed that
E[W (2, µ2)] ≈ 1/(1 − λ2) in Theorem 6 in [12]. In fact, E[W (2, µ2)] >
1/(1− λ2) for all arrival rates for the following reason. System 2 is the same
as the classical two parallel queues model with the routing-to-the-shortest-
queue policy. A well known coupling argument implies that system 2 has a
strictly larger expected waiting time than theM/M/2 queueing model of two
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independent servers with unit exponential service rate and a single shared
queueing buffer with total arrival rate 2λ. The M/M/2 queueing model can
be easily modeled as a birth-death process and the equilibrium queue length
distribution is given by
π(0) = (1− λ)/(1 + λ), π(k) = 2λk(1− λ)/(1 + λ), k ≥ 1,(5.1)
and thus the expected queue length is 2λ
1−λ2
. By Little’s Law, the expected
waiting time is 1
1−λ2
.
By comparing system 1 with system 2, it follows that E[W (2, µ2)] >
E[W (2, µ1)]. Therefore, the sampling of more queues by some customers can
have a negative externality on customers sampling more than one queue.
6. Conclusions. Our results indicate that the equilibrium picture for
the supermarket game can be somewhat complicated, at least if 0.5 < λ2 < 1.
In particular, there may be multiple Nash equilibria, stemming from the fact
that customers do not always have an “avoid the crowd” response as when
λ2 ≤ 0.5. However, this complication seems to occur only for λ close to one
and Lmax fairly large. Also, at least in the mean field model, the positive
externality of increased sampling holds for the whole range λ < 1. For the
finite N model, the coupling result in [20] shows that sampling more queues
by some customers has a positive externality on customers who only sample
one queue. However, for customers who sample more than one queue, the
samplings of more queues by other customers can have a negative externality,
as shown by the example in Section 5.
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Lemma 3 . First, let us show that C(µi, µ−i) is con-
tinuous in µi for any fixed µ−i. Let ‖µ(n)i − µi‖TV → 0 as n → ∞, then we
have
| C(µ(n)i , µ−i)− C(µi, µ−i) | = |
Lmax∑
Li=1
C(Li, µ−i)
(
µ
(n)
i (Li)− µi(Li)
)
|
(a)
≤ K
Lmax∑
Li=1
| µ(n)(Li)− µ(Li) |→ 0, as n→∞,
where (a) follows from the fact that C(Li, µ−i) is uniformly bounded, which
is proved in Lemma 2. Furthermore, P(L) is a compact set and thus C is
uniformly continuous in µi for any fixed µ−i.
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Second, we show that C is continuous in µ−i for any fixed µi. It suffices
to show that E[W (L, µ−i)] is continuous in µ−i. Let ‖µ(n)−i − µ−i‖TV → 0
as n → ∞. First, note that the mean field equilibrium distribution rµ−i(k)
is continuous in µ−i for each k. Second, by Lemma 2, rµ(k) ≤ λk,∀k,∀µ ∈
P(L). Therefore, for ∀ǫ > 0, by choosing sufficiently large K,
|E[W (L, µ(n)−i )]−
K∑
k=0
rL
µ
(n)
−i
(k)| ≤ ǫ
3
|E[W (L, µ−i)]−
K∑
k=0
rLµ−i(k)| ≤
ǫ
3
.
Also, since rµ−i(k) is continuous in µ−i for each k, by choosing sufficiently
large N0, it follows that when n ≥ N0,
|
K∑
k=0
rL
µ
(n)
−i
(k)−
K∑
k=0
rLµ−i(k)| ≤
ǫ
3
.
Therefore,
|E[W (L, µ(n)−i )]− E[W (L, µ−i)]| ≤ ǫ.
Furthermore, P(L) is a compact set and thus C is uniformly continuous in
µ−i for any fixed µi.
Lastly, let us show that C(µi, µ−i) is jointly continuous with respect to µi
and µ−i. Let (µ
(n)
i , µ
(n)
−i ) → (µi, µ−i) in total variation distance as n → ∞,
then
| C(µ(n)i , µ(n)−i )− C(µi, µ−i) |
≤| C(µ(n)i , µ(n)−i )− C(µi, µ(n)−i ) | + | C(µi, µ(n)−i )−C(µi, µ−i) |
=|
Lmax∑
Li=1
C(Li, µ
(n)
−i )
(
µ
(n)
i (Li)− µi(Li)
)
| + | C(µi, µ(n)−i )− C(µi, µ−i) |
≤ K
Lmax∑
Li=1
| µ(n)i (Li)− µi(Li) | + | C(µi, µ(n)−i )− C(µi, µ−i) |
→ 0, as n→∞,
which concludes the proof.
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A.2. Proof of Theorem 1 . Since µ
(n)
i ∈ BR(µ(n)−i ), for all µˆi ∈ P(L),
C(µˆi, µ
(n)
−i ) ≥ C(µ(n)i , µ(n)−i ).(A.1)
By the continuity of C proved in Lemma 3,
lim
n→∞
C(µˆi, µ
(n)
−i ) = C(µˆi, µ−i),
lim
n→∞
C(µ
(n)
i , µ
(n)
−i ) = C(µi, µ−i).
Therefore, for all µˆi ∈ P(L), C(µˆi, µ−i) ≥ C(µi, µ−i) and thus µi ∈ BR(µ−i).
Then, by the Kakutani’s Theorem, there must exist a µ⋆ as a fixed point
of BR and thus µ⋆ is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, by
Lemma 1, µ⋆ can be identified with a real number L⋆ ∈ [1, Lmax].
A.3. Proof of Lemma 4 . The first half of the lemma is proved first.
For any integer Li ∈ L such that Li ∈ BR(µ−i), C(Li, µ−i) ≤ C(Li −
1, µ−i) and C(Li, µ−i) ≤ C(Li + 1, µ−i). Thus equation (3.4) easily follows
by invoking the definition of C(Li, µ−i).
Now suppose equation (3.4) holds. Since V (Li, µ−i) is strictly decreasing
in Li,
V (L, µ−i)
{ ≥ cs/c if L < Li,
≤ cs/c if L > Li,
which implies that for all L ∈ L, C(Li, µ−i) ≤ C(L, µ−i) and thus Li ∈
BR(µ−i).
The second half of the lemma is proved next. For any non-integer Li ∈
[1, Lmax] such that Li ∈ BR(µ−i), ⌊Li⌋ ∈ BR(µ−i) and ⌊Li⌋+ 1 ∈ BR(µ−i).
It follows from equation (3.4) that
V (⌊Li⌋, µ−i) ≤ cs/c ≤ V (⌊Li⌋+ 1− 1, µ−i),(A.2)
which implies equation(3.5).
Now suppose equation (3.5) holds. Since V (Li, µ−i) is strictly decreasing
in Li,
V (⌊Li⌋, µ−i) = cs/c < V (⌊Li⌋ − 1, µ−i),(A.3)
which implies that ⌊Li⌋ ∈ BR(µ−i) by the first half of the lemma just proved.
Similarly, we can show that ⌊Li⌋+ 1 ∈ BR(µ−i). Therefore, Li ∈ BR(µ−i).
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A.4. Proof of Lemma 5. We first show that V (Li, µ−i) > V (Li, µ˜−i)
for all 1 ≤ Li ≤ Lmax − 1, i.e.,
∞∑
k=0
(rLiµ−i(k)− rLi+1µ−i (k)) >
∞∑
k=0
(rLiµ˜−i(k)− r
Li+1
µ˜−i
(k)).
We prove a stronger conclusion, that is, for k ≥ 2,
rLiµ−i(k)− rLi+1µ−i (k) > rLiµ˜−i(k)− r
Li+1
µ˜−i
(k).
By Lemma 2, for k ≥ 2,
rµ˜−i(k) < rµ−i(k) ≤ λk ≤
1
2
.
Define function g(x) = xLi − xLi+1. It is easy to calculate that g′(x) =
xLi−1(Li − (Li + 1)x). It follows that for x < 12 , g′(x) > 0. Therefore,
g(rµ−i(k)) > g(rµ˜−i(k)),∀k ≥ 2.
Next, we show that L˜i ≤ Li.
Case 1 (L˜i is an integer): Since L˜i ∈ BR(µ˜i), it follows from Lemma 4
that
V (L˜i − 1, µ−i) > V (L˜i − 1, µ˜−i) ≥ cs/c,
which implies that ⌊Li⌋ > L˜i − 1 again by Lemma 4 and thus Li ≥ L˜i.
Case 2 (L˜i is a non-integer): From Lemma 4,
V (⌊L˜i⌋, µ−i) > V (⌊L˜i⌋, µ˜−i) = cs/c.
By Lemma 4, it follows that: (i) if Li is a non-integer, then ⌊Li⌋ > ⌊L˜i⌋; (ii)
if Li is an integer, then Li > ⌊L˜i⌋. Therefore, Li > L˜i.
A.5. Proof of Lemma 6 . For case (a), V (Lmax − 1, Lmax) ≥ csc . By
Lemma 4, it follows that Lmax ∈ BR(Lmax) and thus Lmax is a Nash equi-
librium.
As for case (b), note that Lˆ is well defined, because V (Lmax−1, Lmax) < csc .
In the case (b1), V (Lˆ, Lˆ) ≤ csc and by the definition of Lˆ, V (Lˆ− 1, Lˆ) ≥ csc .
Therefore, by Lemma 4, Lˆ ∈ BR(Lˆ). In the case (b2), V (Lˆ, Lˆ) > csc and
by the definition of Lˆ, V (Lˆ, Lˆ + 1) < csc . Since V (Li, L−i) is continuous
in L−i ∈ R, it follows that there exists a q⋆ with 0 < q⋆ < 1 such that
V (Lˆ, Lˆ + q⋆) = csc . Therefore, by Lemma 4, Lˆ + q
⋆ ∈ BR(Lˆ + q⋆) and thus
Lˆ+ q⋆ is a Nash equilibrium.
THE SUPERMARKET GAME 33
A.6. Proof of Theorem 3. (sufficiency) Let L⋆ ∈ [1, Lmax] denote any
Nash equilibrium, and define Lˆ := min{L ∈ L : V (L,L + 1) < cs/c}. By
definition, V (Lmax, Lmax+1) = 0 and thus Lˆ is well defined. Also, it follows
that
V (L,L+ 1) > V (L+ 1, L+ 1) > V (L+ 1, L+ 2), for 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax − 2,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that V (Li, µ−i) is strictly
decreasing in Li, and the second inequality follows from the monotonicity
assumption of V (L,L+ q) in q. Therefore, V (L,L+1) is strictly decreasing
in L.
Next, the following three different cases of Lˆ are considered:
Case 1 (Lˆ = Lmax): By the definition of Lˆ, it follows that V (L,L + 1) ≥
cs/c for all 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax − 1. Hence,
V (L,L) > V (L,L+ 1) ≥ cs/c, for 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax − 1.(A.4)
Therefore, by Lemma 4, L⋆ cannot be an integer less than Lmax. Now if L
⋆
is a non-integer less than Lmax, then ⌊L⋆⌋ ≤ Lmax− 1. Thus, it follows from
(A.4) that
V (⌊L⋆⌋, L⋆) > V (⌊L⋆⌋, ⌊L⋆⌋+ 1) ≥ cs/c.(A.5)
On the other hand, by the definition of L⋆ and Lemma 4, V (⌊L⋆⌋, L⋆) = cs/c,
which is a contradiction to (A.5). Therefore, L⋆ must be Lmax.
Case 2 (Lˆ ≤ Lmax − 1): Since V (L,L + 1) is strictly decreasing in L, by
the definition of Lˆ, V (Lmax − 1, Lmax) < cs/c. Therefore, by Lemma 4, L⋆
cannot be Lmax.
Case 2(a): If L⋆ is an integer less than Lmax, then
V (L⋆, L⋆) ≤ cs/c ≤ V (L⋆ − 1, L⋆).
By monotonicity assumption, it follows that
V (L,L+ 1) ≥ V (L⋆ − 1, L⋆) ≥ cs/c for L ≤ L⋆ − 1,
V (L⋆, L⋆ + 1) < V (L⋆, L⋆) ≤ cs/c.
Therefore, L⋆ − 1 < Lˆ ≤ L⋆ and thus L⋆ = Lˆ.
Case 2(b): If L⋆ is a non-integer, then V (⌊L⋆⌋, L⋆) = cs/c. By monotonic-
ity assumption,
V (⌊L⋆⌋, ⌊L⋆⌋+ 1) < V (⌊L⋆⌋, L⋆) = cs
c
.(A.6)
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Also, for L < ⌊L⋆⌋ − 1 ,
V (L,L+ 1) > V (⌊L⋆⌋ − 1, ⌊L⋆⌋) > V (⌊L⋆⌋, ⌊L⋆⌋) > V (⌊L⋆⌋, L⋆) = cs/c.
Therefore, ⌊L⋆⌋ − 1 < Lˆ ≤ ⌊L⋆⌋ and thus ⌊L⋆⌋ = Lˆ. Furthermore, since
V (⌊L⋆⌋, ⌊L⋆⌋ + 1) < cs/c < V (⌊L⋆⌋, ⌊L⋆⌋), by monotonicity assumption,
there is a unique q⋆ with 0 < q⋆ < 1 such that V (Lˆ, Lˆ + q⋆) = csc and thus
L⋆ = Lˆ+ q⋆.
(Necessary) Suppose the local monotonicity condition is not satisfied. It is
well known that a continuous, injective (i.e. one-to-one) function g on an
interval [a, b] is either strictly monotone increasing or strictly monotone de-
creasing, so there are two cases to consider.
Case 1: There exists a L with 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax such that V (L,L + q) is
strictly increasing for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Because V (L − 1, L) > V (L,L), c and cs
can be selected to satisfy
V (L,L) ≤ cs/c = V (L,L+ q0) ≤ V (L− 1, L)
for some 0 < q0 < 1. From Lemma 4, it follows that L is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium and L+ q0 is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the
supermarket game has at least two Nash equilibria.
Case 2: There exists a L with 1 ≤ L ≤ Lmax such that V (L,L + q2) =
V (L,L + q3) with 0 ≤ q2 < q3 ≤ 1. Then, if c and cs are selected so that
cs
c = V (L,L+q2) = V (L,L+q3), both L+q2 and L+q3 are Nash equilibria.
Therefore, in either case, there are at least two Nash equilibria and thus
the local monotonicity condition is necessary.
A.7. Proof of Lemma 7 . Suppose µ ∈ P(L) such that there exists
L1 < L2 < L3 with µ(L1) > 0 and µ(L3) > 0. Choose 0 < α, β ≤ µ(L1) such
that αL1+βL3 = (α+β)L2. Then, we construct a new mixed strategy µ˜ as
µ˜(L1) = µ(L1)− α, µ˜(L3) = µ(L3)− β, µ˜(L2) = µ(L2) + α+ β,
and µ˜(L) = µ(L) for L 6= L1, L2, L3. By the definition of uµ(x) and convexity,
uµ(x)− uµ˜(x) = αxL1 + βxL3 − (α+ β)xL2 > 0.
Therefore, rµ˜(k) < rµ(k), k ≥ 2. It follows then
Csum(µ˜) < λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ˜(L)
(
∞∑
k=0
rLµ (k) + csL
)
< Csum(µ),
where the second inequality follows from the strict convexity of E[W (L, µ)]
in L. Therefore, µ 6= µ⋆soc.
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A.8. Proof of Lemma 9 . Suppose L
(n)
−i → L−i as n → ∞. By
the definition of metric, we have µ
L
(n)
−i
→ µL−i . Since E[W (Li(c), L−i)] =
E[W (Li(c), µL−i)], by the continuity of E[W (Li(c), µL−i)] with respect to
µL−i , we conclude that E[W (Li(c), L−i)] is continuous in L−i(·).
Next, we show that the correspondence BR(L−i) is in fact a function. Let
Li ∈ BR(L−i) and 0 = c0 < c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax denote the jumping
points of Li. It follows from Fig. 6 that for j = 1, . . . , Lmax−1, cj is uniquely
determined by
cj =
cs
E[W (j, L−i)]− E[W (j + 1, L−i)] .
Therefore, Li is unique and BR(L−i) is a function from S to S.
Finally, we show the continuity of BR(L−i). Suppose L
(n)
−i → L−i, L(n)i =
BR(L
(n)
−i ), and Li = BR(L−i), we prove that L
(n)
i → Li. Denote the jumping
points of L
(n)
i and Li by 0 = c
(n)
0 < c
(n)
1 < · · · < c(n)Lmax = cmax and 0 = c0 <
c1 < · · · < cLmax = cmax respectively. It suffices to show that c(n)j → cj , for
j = 0, . . . , Lmax. From Fig. 6, we can see that for j = 1, . . . , Lmax − 1,
c
(n)
j =
cs
E[W (j, L
(n)
−i )]− E[W (j + 1, L(n)−i )]
.
By the continuity of E[W (L,L−i)] with respect to L−i(·),
c
(n)
j → cj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ Lmax − 1,
which further implies that µ
L
(n)
i
→ µLi and concludes the proof.
A.9. Proof of Theorem 6 . Define the jumping measure as
J(ξ, x, dy) = λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)L〈χL(x, ·), ξ⊗L−1〉δx+1(dy) + 1x≥1δx−1(dy).
It follows that ‖J(ξ, x)‖TV ≤ λLmax + 1. Also,
‖J(ξ, x) − J(η, x)‖TV = λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)L | 〈χL(x, ·), ξ⊗L−1 − η⊗L−1〉 |
≤ λLmax‖ξ⊗L−1 − η⊗L−1‖TV,
‖ξ⊗L−1 − η⊗L−1‖TV ≤ λLmax(Lmax − 1)‖ξ − η‖TV.
Therefore, ‖J(ξ, x) − J(η, x)‖TV ≤ λLmax(Lmax − 1)‖ξ − η‖TV, which con-
cludes the proof using Proposition 2.3 in [7].
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A.10. Proof of Theorem 7. It is proved using a method developed by
Sznitman [17] with three essential steps: proving that
1. (L (νN ))N≥1 is tight in P(P(D(R+,N))).
2. the nonlinear martingale problem (4.1) is satisfied by any probability
measure in the support of any accumulation point of (L (νN ))N≥1.
3. the nonlinear martingale problem (4.1) has a unique solution Γ starting
at any γ in P(N).
Once these three steps are done, Step 2 and Step 3 imply that the only
possible accumulation point of (L (νN ))N≥1 is δΓ, and Step 1 implies that
(L (νN ))N≥1 weakly converges to δΓ. By Proposition 2.2 in [17], the conclu-
sions follows. The individual steps are proved as follows.
Step 1. It is equivalent to prove that (L (QN1 ))N≥1 is tight in P(D(R+,N)),
see Proposition 2.2 in [17]. The jumps of QN1 are included in those of a Pois-
son process AN of rate λLmax + 1, and their size is bounded by 1, so the
modulus of continuity in D(R+,N) of Q
N
1 is less than that of A
N . The law of
AN does not depend on N ≥ 1, and since (QN1 (0))N≥1 converges and hence
is tight, the basic tightness criterion in Ethier and Kurtz [5] holds.
Step 2. Let ΠN be the law of νN and Π∞ ∈ P(P(D(R+,N))) be an
accumulation point. Take 0 ≤ s1 < · · · < sk ≤ s < t and a bounded function
g on Nk, and then define G : P(D(R+,N)) 7→ R as
G(R) = 〈
(
φ(Qt)− φ(Qs)−
∫ t
s
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L){λL〈χL(Qu, ·), R⊗L−1u 〉φ+(Qu)
+ 1Qu≥1φ
−(Qu)}du
)
g(Qs1 , . . . , Qsk), R〉
Set gi,N = g(Q
(N)
i (s1), . . . , Q
(N)
i (sk)) and Ys,t = Yt − Ys for a process Y . It
follows that
〈G2,ΠN 〉
= E
[
G2(νN )
]
= E
[
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Mφ,i,Ns,t − ǫφ,i,Ns,t )gi,N )2
]
=
1
N
E
[
(Mφ,1,Ns,t g
1,N )2
]
+
N − 1
N
E
[
Mφ,1,Ns,t M
φ,2,N
s,t g
1,Ng2,N
]
+O(
1
N
)
=
‖g‖2∞
N
E[〈Mφ,1,N ,Mφ,1,N 〉s,t] + N − 1
N
E[〈Mφ,1,N ,Mφ,2,N 〉s,t]‖g‖2∞ +O(
1
N
)
and then Lemma 12 implies that 〈G2,ΠN 〉 = O(1/N). The Fatou lemma
implies that 〈G2,Π∞〉 ≤ limN→∞〈G2,ΠN 〉 = 0 and thus G(R) = 0, Π∞-a.s.
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Since this holds for arbitrary bounded g and 0 ≤ s1 < · · · < sk ≤ s < t,
we conclude that R solves the nonlinear martingale problem (4.1), Π∞-a.s.
Furthermore, the continuity of Q→ Q0 implies that R0 = γ, Π∞-a.s.
Step 3. This result is proved in Theorem 6.
A.11. Proof of Lemma 13 . First, note that increasing r0(k) only
increases all rt(k), because drt(k)/dt is non-decreasing in rt(j) for j 6= k
[4]. Therefore, it suffices to show the conclusion for the following two cases:
r0(k) ≥ r(k),∀k and r0(k) ≤ r(k),∀k.
Second, define vKt (k) =
∑K
j≥k rt(j) and vt(k) = v
∞
t (k). We show that
for the above two cases, vt(k) is uniformly bounded over all t and k. If
r0(k) ≤ r(k),∀k, since r(k) is a fixed point, rt(k) ≤ r(k) for all t. Therefore,
vt(k) ≤ vt(1) ≤
∑
j≥1
r(j) ≤
∑
j≥1
λj =
λ
1− λ.
If r0(k) ≥ r(k),∀k, then rt(k) ≥ r(k) for all t. From the mean field equation
(4.3),
dvKt (1)
dt
= λ− λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)rLt (K)− (rt(1) − rt(K + 1)) ≤ λ.
It follows that vKt (1) ≤ λt and thus vt(1) ≤ λt, which further implies that
limK→∞ rt(K) = 0. Therefore, taking limit K → ∞ over both sides of the
above equation gives
dvt(1)
dt
= λ− rt(1) = r(1)− rt(1) ≤ 0.
Thus, vt(k) ≤ vt(1) ≤ v0(1).
Finally, in order to show that limt→∞ rt(k) = r(k), it suffices to show
−∞ <
∫ ∞
0
(rt(k)− r(k)) <∞,
because under the above two cases, the sign of (rt(k)−r(k)) does not change
in t. We prove the second inequality by induction and the first inequality can
be proved in the same way. The first inequality trivially holds for k = 0 since
rt(0) = r(0) = 1. Now suppose it holds for k − 1. From mean field equation
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(4.3) and definition of r(k),
dvt(k)
dt
= λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)rLt (k − 1)− rt(k)
= λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)
(
rLt (k − 1)− rL(k − 1)
) − (rt(k)− r(k)).
By integrating it, it follows that
vt(k) = v0(k) +
∫ t
0
[
λ
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)
(
rLs (k − 1)− rL(k − 1)
) − (rs(k)− r(k))
]
ds.
By induction,
∫∞
0 (rt(k − 1)− r(k − 1))dt <∞. Therefore,∫ t
0
Lmax∑
L=1
µ(L)
(
rLs (k − 1)− rL(k − 1)
)
ds ≤ Lmax
∫ ∞
0
(rt(k − 1)− r(k − 1))dt.
By assumption, v0(k) is bounded and we just proved that vt(k) is uniformly
bounded in t. Thus,
∫∞
0 (rt(k) − r(k))dt <∞ and the conclusion follows.
A.12. Proof of Theorem 10. Let Lst ∈ P(D(R+,N)) denote the sta-
tionary measure on the path space of the finite N model. Let Lst(Q¯
N
0 ) denote
the distribution of Q¯N0 under the stationary measure, and let Lst(Q
N
1 (0))
denote the distribution of QN1 (0) under the stationary measure.
Step 1. Prove that (Lst(Q¯
N
0 ))N≥1 is tight. It is equivalent to prove that
(Lst(Q
N
1 (0)))N≥1 is tight. Let system 0 be the finite N model with all the
customers sampling one queue; while system 1 be the finite N model with
all the customers using strategy µ. The system 0 is an i.i.d. system. If both
systems are started at the same initial value, with law being the stationary
distribution of system 0. Then, by the coupling result in Theorem 8,
E[QN,11 (t)] =
1
N
E[
N∑
i=1
QN,1i (t)] ≤
1
N
E[
N∑
i=1
QN,0i (t)] =
λ
1− λ.
Since λ < 1, by the ergodicity result in Theorem 9 and Fatou lemma,
Est[Q
N
1 (0)] ≤ lim inft→∞ E[Q
N,1
1 (t)] ≤
λ
1− λ,
which implies that for all N ≥ 1, Lst(QN1 (0))([K,∞)) ≤ λ(1−λ)−1K−1 and
hence Lst(Q
N
1 (0))N≥1 is tight.
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Step 2. Prove that Lst(Q¯
N
0 ) weakly converges to δγµ . Let Π
∞
0 be an
accumulation point of Lst(Q¯
N
0 ). Suppose the finite N model starts with
the stationary distribution. Let ΠN denote the law of νN and Π∞ denote an
accumulation point of ΠN . Then, we can prove exactly as for Theorem 7 that
ΠN is tight, and that any law R in the support of Π∞ satisfies the non-linear
martingale problem. In particular, (Rt)t≥0 solves the nonlinear Kolmogorov
equation. Since the initial distribution is the stationary distribution, ΠN0 =
ΠNt . Taking the limit along the subsequence, it follows that Π
∞
0 = Π
∞
t .
Take ǫ > 0 and an open neighborhood V of γµ. For j ∈ N, let Pj be the
set of all η in P(N) such that the solution for the Kolmogorov equation (4.2)
starting at η is in V for all times t ≥ j. By Lemma 13, P(N) = ∪jPj and
since Pj ⊂ Pj+1, there is k such that Π∞0 (Pk) > 1− ǫ. It follows that
Π∞0 (V ) = Π
∞
k (V ) = Π
∞(Rk ∈ V ) ≥ Π∞(R0 ∈ Pk) = Π∞0 (Pk) > 1− ǫ.
Because ǫ and V are arbitrarily chosen, Π∞0 ({γµ}) = 1.
Step 3. Since Q¯N0 converges in law to γµ, by Theorem 7, the conclusions
follow.
REFERENCES
[1] Alanyali, M. and Dashouk, M. (2011). Occupancy distributions of homogeneous
queueing systems under opportunistic scheduling. IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory 57, 1 (Jan.), 256 –266.
[2] Bordenava, C., McDonald, D., and Proutiere, A. (2010). A particle system
in interaction with a rapidly varying environment: Mean field limits and applications.
Journal on Networks and Heterogeneous Media 5, 31–62.
[3] Bramson, M., Lu, Y., and Prabhakar, B. (2010). Randomized load balancing with
general service time distributions. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS 2010. New
York, NY, USA, 275–286.
[4] Deimling, K. (1977). Ordinary Differential Equations in Banach Spaces. Vol. 96.
Springer.
[5] Ethier, S. and Kurtz, T. (1986). Markov Processes: Characterization and Conver-
gence. John wiley, New York.
[6] Ganesh, A., Lilienthal, S., Manjunath, D., Proutiere, A., and Simatos, F.
(2010). Load balancing via random local search in closed and open systems. SIGMET-
RICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 38, 287–298.
[7] Graham, C. (2000). Chaoticity on path space for a queueing network with selection
of the shortest queue among several. Appl. Prob. 37, 198–211.
[8] Hassin, R. and Haviv, M. (1994). Equilibrium strategies and the value of informaiton
in a two line queueing system with threshold jockeying. Commun. Statist. Stochastic
Models 10(2), 415–435.
[9] Hassin, R. and Haviv, M. (2003). To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in
queueing systems. International series in Operations Research and Management Science,
Springer.
40 J. XU AND B. HAJEK
[10] Hassin, R. and Roet-Green, R. Equilibrium in a two dimensional queue-
ing game: When inspecting the queue is costly. preprint (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.math.tau.ac.il/ hassin/ricky.pdf.
[11] Huang, M., Caines, P., and Malhame, R. (2007). Large-population cost-coupled
LQG problems with nonuniform agents: Individual-mass behavior and decentralized
ǫ-Nash equilibria. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 52, 9 (Sept.), 1560 –1571.
[12] Kingman, J. (1966). Two similar queues in parallel. Annals of Mathematical Statis-
tics 32, 1314–1323.
[13] Lasry, J. M. and Lions, P. L. (2007). Mean field games. Japanese Journal of
Mathematics, 229–260.
[14] Luczak, M. and McDiarmid, C. (2006). On the maximum queue length in the
supermarket model. Ann. Probab. 34, 493–527.
[15] Mitzenmacher, M. (1996). The power of two choices in randomized load balancing.
Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of California, Berkeley.
[16] Mitzenmacher, M. (2001). The power of two choices in randomized load balancing.
IEEE Trans. on Parallel and Distributed Systems 12:10, 1094–1104.
[17] Sznitman, A. (1991). Topics in propagation of chaos. In Springer Verlag Lecture
Notes in Mathematics 1464, P. Hennequin, Ed. Springer-Verlag, 165–251.
[18] Tsitsiklis, J. N. and Xu, K. (2011). On the power of (even a little) centralization
in distributed processing. SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev. 39, 121–132.
[19] Tsitsiklis, J. N. and Xu, K. (2012). On the power of (even a little) resource
pooling. Stochastic Systems 2, 1–66.
[20] Turner, S. (1998). The effect of increasing routing choice on resource pooling. Prob.
Eng. Inf. Sci. 12, 109–123.
[21] Vvedenskaya, N. D., Dobrushin, R. L., and Karpelevich, F. I. (1996). Queue-
ing system with selection of the shortest of two queues: An asymptotic approach. Prob.
Inf. Trans 32, 15–27.
Coordinated Science Laboratory,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana, IL, 61801, USA
E-mail: jxu18@illinois.edu
b-hajek@uiuc.edu
